ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN FORUM SHOPPING:
CONFLICTS LAW AS SPONTANEOUS ORDER
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The development of . . . rules will . . . involve a continuous interaction between the rules of law
and expectations: while new rules will be laid down to protect existing expectations, every new
rule will also tend to create new expectation. As some of the prevailing expectations will always
conflict with each other, the judge will constantly have to decide which is to be treated as
legitimate and in doing so will provide the basis for new expectations. . . .[T]he judge will never
be able to foresee all the consequences of the rule he lays down, and will often fail in his endeavor
to reduce the sources of conflicts of expectations . . . . [I]t is only by their effects on [the] order of
actions, effects that will be discovered only by trial and error, that the adequacy or inadequacy of
the rules can be judged.3

INTRODUCTION
Hypothetical Number One
A pair of men engage in a murder spree, with victims scattered over three states. Once
they are captured, where are they to be charged and tried? In the United States, they could be
tried for murder in any one or all of the three states. In addition, they could face prosecution in
federal court on related charges. Suppose further that the states had different penalties for
murder, with a capital sentence available in only one of the states. The prosecutors decide to
charge the men with the crimes in the death penalty state.4
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This hypothetical is loosely based on the widely publicized “Beltway Snipers” case. John Allen Muhammad and
John Lee Malvo are alleged to have committed murders in Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia. They
are being tried in Virginia, where the death penalty is a possibility. At the time the two were charged, Maryland had
a moratoriam on the death penalty. The choice of penalties was one of reasons why the prosecutors chose Virginia
as the forum. See Susan Schmidt and Josh White, Sniper Suspects Handed to Va. for Trials, WASH. POST, Nov. 8,
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Hypothetical Number Two
A man commits a murder in an American state, and then flees overseas to another
country known to prohibit extradition of its citizens to the United States. Even though this man
was born in the United States, he claims citizenship of the foreign country based on the fact that
his father was a citizen of the foreign country at the time of his birth. That country’s Supreme
Court agrees, and holds that the policy of not extraditing citizens applies to the man. Further
suppose that this country has a policy of pursuing a domestic prosecution in such cases.
However, the maximum sentence it imposes is lighter than the minimum the man would have
received in the United States if he had been convicted.5

In both the cases, the very fact that the more than one state can legitimately exercise
jurisdiction over the parties gives rise to the possibility that the outcome depends on the choice
of forum. In the first case, the choice of forum rests with the prosecution; in the second with the
defendant. The prosecution will seek a forum with the highest penalty; the defendant will try to
get a forum with the lightest sentence. That, after all, is simply rational behavior.6 But, while
prosecutors often make such decisions with little public acknowledgment or outcry, a defendant
exercising a similar choice could face vociferous condemnation. 7
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(2002) (disbarring Samuel Sheibein’s father, a member of the Maryland Bar, for his role in assisting Samuel’s flight
to Israel).

6

Rationality in this sense draws from the economics literature, and refers to the notion that each party will attempt
to maximize his own utility. For a prosecutor, other things being equal, the best result would be getting the
maximum penalty. For a defendant, if conviction is inevitable, and other things being equal, the lowest sentence
maximizes utility, in that it is the least bad outcome available.

7

The dissent in Att’y Griev. Com’m v. Sheibein, 372 Md 224, 269 supra, makes this point , saying,
Indeed, when more than one sovereign has jurisdiction to prosecute a person for homicide, it appears
to be entirely appropriate for those on the prosecution side to send the alleged perpetrator to the

2

The notion that the choice of forum could, at an extreme, literally be a matter of life and
death for the defendant, as is the case in these hypotheticals, is intuitively troubling. But, in a
world with overlapping jurisdictions, multiple legal regimes and transactions that span these
jurisdictions, a legal dispute, including criminal cases such as these, might often be pursued in
more than one jurisdiction. Inevitably, in some, if not many cases, the outcome could depend on
the choice of forum, which in turn, raises the issue of who controls the choice of forum.
The availability of alternative forums has troubled conflicts scholars, on the grounds that
this “forum shopping” was inefficient8 or unjust.9 Among the suggestions made to rectify this
allegedly chaotic situation is national conflicts legislation;10 a new Restatement;11 and less
radical modifications using efficiency as a yardstick.12 One scholar has suggested that there is no
significant problem as conflicts law is, at best, marginally relevant to the final outcome of
litigation.13

sovereign likely to impose the most severe punishment. *** According to the majority opinion,
however, it is not appropriate for those on the defense side to send the alleged perpetrator to the
sovereign likely to impose a less severe punishment. If prosecutors are free to forum-shop for a
jurisdiction with more severe penalties, or a broader capital punishment statute, when choosing where
to prosecute the accused, the defense should not be punished for sending the accused to a jurisdiction
with less severe maximum penalties. (Eldridge J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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This article argues that fears about the seeming chaos of conflicts law are overblown.
Conflicts law has emerged largely from the common law, and is an example of what Friedrich
Hayek termed “spontaneous order.”14 The superficial confusion observed in conflicts law does
not mean that there are no underlying rules. In fact, conflicts law is an example of Hayek’s
nomos, and it has evolved so as to maintain a spontaneous order that sustains liberty, cosmos, in
Hayek’s terminology.15 The paper examines the rules that have evolved over time and argues
that these rules work to largely correct the problems of adverse selection16 and moral hazard17
inherent in a world where parties have the choice of alternative forums, particularly in the United
States, with the additional bounds imposed by constitutional restrictions on personal
jurisdiction.18 Thus, while a perfect result, where the same circumstances always lead to the
same outcome, is not possible every time, conflicts law has evolved so as to fulfill legitimate
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expectations most of the time. While the present body of conflicts law is not perfect, like
democracy, it is better than any of the suggested alternatives.19
Part I explores the various approaches to conflicts of law, and how they give rise to the
possibility of forum shopping. Part II examines the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
inherent in forum shopping. Part III examines how conflicts law has evolved to solve such
problems in the case of contracts, torts and real property. This supports the conclusion that
conflicts law is part of the spontaneous order from which the law of liberty, in the Hayekian
sense, evolves. Part IV concludes by distinguishing between legitimate forum selection and
illegitimate forum shopping.

I.

APPROACHES TO CONFLICT OF LAWS
Conflict of laws rules are rules of the domestic jurisdiction that are used to deal with

disputes that are involve the interests of more than one jurisdiction.20 The dispute can involve
the interests of more than one state, within the United States, or more than one nation. The
approaches discussed here apply in both the interstate and international disputes; there is no
reason to treat them differently and we do not distinguish between intra-state and international
applications.
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in 1947:
“ Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No
one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the
worst form of Government except all those others that have been tried from time to time.”
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Modern conflicts of laws approaches address three main issues: adjudicatory jurisdiction,
substantive competence and choice of governing law; and recognition of judgments.21
Traditionally, the goals of conflicts systems were held to be uniformity, predictability and
avoidance of forum shopping.22 However, these goals were de-emphasized in Brainerd Currie’s
interest analysis approach,23 with his focus on other values, including policy goals of the state.
Nonetheless, uniformity and predictability remain important; the idea that the choice of forum
can result in different outcomes of identical cases remains intuitively troubling.
Thus, the extent to which a conflicts system achieves the goals of uniform, predictable
outcomes is a yardstick for measuring the “success” of that system. An ideal conflicts regime
would satisfy what we term the “mirror-image” test: the same set of facts should result in the
application of the same substantive law, regardless of the forum in which suit is bought. Such a
system would eliminate the incentive to forum shop.
Over time, three major approaches to conflicts of laws have developed that seek to
achieve some sort of balance between the three goals of uniformity, predictability, and avoidance
of forum shopping. The first is lex fori, or a unilateral approach, where the law of the forum is
always applied. This is the simplest approach and appealing for this reason, but, as is discussed
below, is rife with problems in its application. The second is a multilateral approach, where the
court attempts to balance the interests of the connected jurisdictions. Standards based regimes,
such as interest analysis and the multifactor-tests of Restatement (Second), fall within this
category. Rules-based regimes, such as those in civil law countries and the Restatement (First),
21
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also are multilateral in approach. The third is a substantive approach, which effectively tries to
apply the best law to the same fact pattern, regardless of whether the dispute in between
intrastate or interstate parties.24 Leflar’s “better rule of law” approach falls within this category.

A.

Unilateral approach

One straightforward solution to conflicts law would be to apply forum law always.25 This
has the advantages of simplicity, clarity and predictability. This approach has advantages for
local actors, including the state officials. The costs of applying local law are lower for the local
justice system; thus there is an argument of judicial economy that supports this approach.
Further, deciding a case according to local law creates valuable precedent, which is a public
good and results in an increase in social welfare.26 Predictability about the use of forum law
reduces a source of uncertainty for parties structuring transactions. As long as parties can exit the
system, the lex fori approach forces a state to internalize the external costs of bad laws,
promoting competition among jurisdictions to improve substantive law.27
Or so it should be, in theory.

In reality, because there is both common law and

legislation, the certainty of knowing that forum law will always apply could exacerbate the
problem by encouraging forum shopping. This certainty gives interest groups an incentive to
24
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of the reputation of a university. All students derive the benefit of an improvement in this reputation, without any
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lobby for favorable legislation. For example, plaintiffs will generally seek to file claims in
jurisdictions where the expected net gain is the largest. The amount of litigation is likely to be
positively correlated with the extent to which the jurisdiction’s laws favor plaintiffs. Therefore,
interest groups that benefit from litigation, such as trial lawyers, would lobby to get such laws
passed. To the extent that such interest groups can be organized, the law might be skewed in
their favor.28
The resulting legislation is “made” law, thesis, in Hayek’s terminology, giving rise to a
“made” order, taxis.29 The laws within this “made” order, due to both imperfect information and
the influence of interest groups, have an inherent tendency toward inefficiency.30 A large body
of literature exists on the role of interest groups in shaping legislation, and is discussed in part _
below. In this situation, certainty that forum law will always be applied actually increases the
incentive to lobby for groups that would benefit from litigation. This leads one to the counter
intuitive result that uncertainty about which jurisdiction’s law applies would actually reduce

28

See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1969). According to Olson, smaller groups face lower
organization costs, and therefore will be able to lobby more successfully for legislation in their favor than large
groups. Thus, smaller groups, which are more cohesive, can wield a disproportionate amount of influence on the
nature of legislation. This problem of interest groups is an important criticism of the legislative process, a factor that
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too many imponderables for a central planner to replicate the efficiency of a market, as the collapse of the centrally
planned economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest. However, the market somehow
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forum shopping.31

This requires applying foreign law as needed through a multilateral

approach.

B.

Multilateral Approach

Under the multilateral approach, the judge tries to balance the interests of the sovereigns
whose policies could be effectuated, or vitiated, through the litigation.32 One way to do this is to
have uniform rules that are applied consistently. This is the prevailing consensus in European
civil law jurisdictions, which generally favor bright-line tests.33 This rules-based approach was
shared by the Restatement (First) of Conflicts. Alternatively, a standards-based regime could also
take a multilateral approach. Thus, Currie’s interest analysis, and much of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts multi-factor tests are multilateral approaches.34 We analyze the benefits
and disadvantages of each regime in turn.
The rules of Restatement (First) were based on a vested-rights theory, with territoriality
as a guiding principle.35 Under these rules based approaches, the court does not consider forum
interests in determining which substantive law applies.36 As long as the rules are applied
consistently, the same substantive law should apply to identical facts, and achieve identical
outcomes. Thus, this rules-based system would eliminate forum shopping, by ensuing uniform
31
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interests of the individuals. See O’Hara and Ribstein, supra note 8. This criticism is consistent with Hayek’s and his
criticism of those who consider law to be solely designed through legislation. See Hayek, supra note 3.
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and predictable results. Thus, under a mirror-image test, a rules-based approach performs
extremely well.37
The problem, of course, was that the rules, at least under the Restatement (First) were not
applied consistently due to the public policy exception and the problem of characterization.
Courts often used the public policy exception to avoid applying the clear rule.38 Similarly,
different results could be obtained, depending on whether the claim was characterized as being
based on tort or contract.39 The problem was compounded when courts engaged in depecage and
applied different states’ laws to different legal issues within the same claim,40 such that none of
states policies were fully effectuated.41 The use of escape devices reduced the probability that
outcomes would indeed be uniform. The use of escape devices by courts increased the
probability that the outcome could vary, depending on the forum where the litigation proceeded,
which, in turn, increased the incentive to forum-shop.42
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See e.g., Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). Two West Virginia residents drove into Indiana, where
they were involved in a one-car accident, resulting in their deaths. The estate of the passenger sued the estate of the
driver for wrongful death. Indiana had a guest statute which granted immunity to the defendant. The West Virginia
trial court applied Indiana law, as being consistent with Restatement (First) rules, that is, the law of the place of the
tort applies. On appeal, after critiquing modern approaches to conflicts, and insisting that Restatement (First) was
the state’s preferred approach, Judge Neely used the public policy exception to reverse the trial court’s decision,
holding that West Virginia law should apply. The Restatement (First)’s rule of place of injury for tort was
circumvented by this decision.

39
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did not. This case could be characterized as either based in tort or contract. The Connecticut court chose to
characterize as a claim based in contract and so avoid the Restatement (First) rule of place of injury for torts.
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Standards based approaches, such as Restatement (Second) and Currie’s interest analysis,
de-emphasize the goals of uniformity and predictability. This is a relativist approach to
sovereignty.43 There is thus “no reason why every case of the same type [would trigger]. . . the
same kinds of interests.”44 In these standards based approaches, the court undertakes a process
of conflicts analysis. There are no clear a priori rules that emerge. These standards based
regimes perform poorly under a mirror-image test, in that it is quite likely that the conflicts
analysis will vary, depending on the court undertaking it, and consequently, the outcome could
depend heavily on the forum of litigation.
The standards based regimes have been criticized for the lack of clarity and predictability,
and the opportunities they provide for forum shopping. But these regimes, in fact, accept the
increased probability of forum shopping as a reasonable tradeoff in achieving the objective of
furthering state interests. A more cogent criticism focuses on Currie’s emphasis on state
interests. State interests are reflected in legislation. Unfortunately, as public choice theory makes
clear, in a world with interest groups and lobbying, there is no reason to believe that legislation
ultimately enacted is socially optimal.45 Thus, a focus on state interests puts special interest
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See Cox supra note 24 at 187.
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Id.
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See Olson, supra note 28; Mueller, supra note 26. This might be a particularly serious problem when the interest
groups are unopposed. Like much public choice theory, we can start from the assumption that a primary goal of
legislators is to get re-elected, and one way to do this is to maximize campaign contributions. The groups that can
organize can also do so to make contributions, and obtain access to legislators. Therefore, the legislators will tend to
push for legislation that favors the special interest group that contributes to their campaign. See e.g., Gene M.
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63 REV. ECON. STUDIES 265
(1996). Legislation that imposed trade barriers, such as tariffs, is a particularly egregious example that favors one
small group, the industry being protected, at the expense of a much larger group, the consumers that pay higher
prices. This distortionary effect might be moderated in the presence of opposing interest groups, where swinging
too far in favor of one group could result in a backlash from opposing groups against that political party. See
Richard Ball, Opposition Backlash and Platform Convergence in a Spatial Model with Campaign Contributions, 98
PUBLIC CHOICE 269 (1999).
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groups ahead of individuals.46 The focus on legislation is troubling, as it implies a focus on
“made order,”47 rather than considering the optimality of spontaneous order, which is essential in
a common law system.

C.

Substantive Approach

Under the substantive law approach, the goal is to eliminate sovereign concerns.48 The
court is freed from the consideration of any the interests of any particular sovereign, and can
choose the best applicable substantive law.49 This, in effect, is Leflar’s “better law” approach. In
theory, this should encourage a “race to the top” for any case.
This approach probably works best in mass litigation situations, such as class action
litigation.50 Such cases are essentially without boundaries, and a search for the better law might
well yield the most efficient, and just, outcome. But it is less likely to be optimal in cases where
territorial boundaries matter, such as unintentional torts. This freedom to choose the “best law” is
even harder to sustain in cases where parties can make a choice of law ex ante, as in a contract or
a market tort, if it meant overruling this choice.
Another fundamental problem with a substantive approach is its emphasis on the “extrasovereign nature of any conflicts fact pattern.”51 Choosing the best law can be accomplished
efficiently only if judges were as well versed in foreign law as they are in their own. This
46

See O’Hara and Ribstein, supra note 8 at 1170.

47

See Hayek, supra note 3.
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See Cox supra note 24.
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See Cox supra note 24 at 173-74.

50

See Cox supra note 24 at 179-80.
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See Cox supra note 24 at 173.
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requires considerable investment of human capital in acquiring such knowledge. Given that
much of their workload will require application of forum law, judges have little incentive to
undertake such investment. And, once judges make substantial investment of human capital in
acquiring knowledge of forum law, they are likely be biased in favor of applying forum law. If
such a bias exists, the possibility of forum shopping cannot be discounted, as litigants become
aware of the bias.

II.

ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN FORUM SHOPPING

The world is an uncertain place. The possibility of forum shopping arises only in the
context of uncertainty.52 When there is uncertainty, parties undertake strategic choices in two
contexts: choice of the opposing party; and choice of forum.53 In the context of litigation, this
means:
(i)

Defendant chooses plaintiff or

(ii)

Plaintiff chooses defendant.

At the second step, once litigation has commenced, a further choice has to be made: that of
forum. This choice can be made be either the plaintiff or defendant. Thus, this is a sequential
game with the following extensive form:

52

In a world with perfect information, and perfect certainty, agents could foresee all events accurately, and there
would be no opportunity to forum shop, because, for example, they could agree on a forum ex ante.

53

See Moore and Parisi, supra note 8.
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Figure 1: Two-sided Adverse Selection Game
Litigation

Forum

(1, -1)

Forum

(0, 0)

(0, 0)

(-1, 1)

: Defendant
: Plaintiff
Expected payoffs in parentheses ( , )
Litigation is treated as a zero sum game here.

In the context of litigation, the first step is the choice of parties. The plaintiff can pick the
defendant, or the other way around. A third possibility also exists: neither exerts full control over
choice of party. For example, in the case of an intentional tort, the defendant picks the plaintiff.
An example of where the plaintiff picks the defendant is a variation of an intentional tort: a
declaratory judgment action.54 Strictly speaking, the “natural” plaintiff is the holder of the patent
property right. In a declaratory judgment action, the infringer, the “natural” defendant, becomes
the plaintiff.55 An example of the third case is a contract claim. A contract is a consensual
transaction; neither party exerts unilateral control over choice of the other party.
This is the step where the problem of adverse selection occurs. The party with the control
has private information that allows him to choose his opponent.56 The choice of participation can

54

See Moore supra note 8; and Moore and Parisi supra note 8.

55

See Moore supra note 8.

56

See Akerloff supra note 16, and Stiglitz and Weiss supra note 16, and text.
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be strategic, and is the equivalent of adverse selection in the litigation context.57 There is twosided adverse selection in the state, as a whole, because the party with the control can be either
defendant or plaintiff.58 For each case, there is strong likelihood that there is adverse selection on
one side.
Once litigation commences, the second step is the selection of the forum in which to
pursue the suit. This choice can rest with the plaintiff, the defendant or neither.59 If the same
substantive law will apply, then there is no room for strategic choice of forum.60 The ability to
choose the forum will have strategic value only if there is a positive probability that the outcome
will be different across different states. A rational party will choose the forum that is most likely
to yield a favorable outcome.61 This is the problem of moral hazard.62
Consider the case where the same party chooses both the opponent and the forum. The
party can be either the defendant or the plaintiff. The party who controls both is clearly at a

57

See Moore and Parisi supra note 8.

58

The discussion here does not include a formal proof, which is outside the scope of the paper. Douglas Gale
provided formal proof of equilibrium in markets with two-sided adverse selection, such that separation of the
different classes of agents occurs. See Douglas Gale, Signaling in Markets With Two-Sided Adverse Selection, 18
ECON. THEORY 391 (2001). For a presentation of an extensive form game with adverse selection, see John Duggan,
An Extensive Form Solution to The Adverse Selection Problem in Principal/Multi-agent Environments, 3 REV.
ECON. DESIGN 167 (1998).
59

See Moore and Parisi, supra note 8, where these alternatives are presented in matrix form.
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That is, if all the possible forums use rules to satisfy apply mirror-image tests, there is no strategic advantage that
can be gained from a choice of forum. See Parisi and O’Hara, supra note 20; and discussion, supra Part II.B. One
example is a rule that the situs determines the applicable law in any claims arising out of real property. This is the
rule for both Restatement (First) and Restatement (Second). As long as the situs rule applies, and the property is
immovable, the same substantive law will apply regardless of where the suit is brought. In this case, any strategic
advantage that can be gained from choice of forum has to come from other sources, such as the applicable statute of
limitations. That is the choice of forum is a multi-dimensional issue. See discussion infra Part III. See also Moore,
supra note 8.
61

That is, the party that can choose the forum will choose one that maximized expected net benefits. See O’Hara and
Ribstein, supra note 8.
62

See Shavell supra note 17 and text.
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strategic advantage. A good illustration is, as discussed above, the declaratory judgment action.
This is one case where the plaintiff can control the choice of defendant and forum.63 The
potential infringer can choose the patent to infringe upon (that is, the defendant) and the location
to conduct the infringing activity (this becomes a possible forum). The potential infringer can
choose to locate in a jurisdiction that offers relatively lower levels of protection for patent rights.
The result is that it is much harder for the patent holder to protect his property right. To the
extent that patent laws are efficient, this opportunity to infringe on the rights created by patents
by forum selection is inefficient.
Consider the case where the defendant picks the plaintiff, but the plaintiff picks the
forum. The control exerted by the plaintiff at the second stage exerts countervailing pressure on
the defendant. The choice of forum is now the plaintiff’s – which adds uncertainty to the
defendant’s calculus. Now the defendant, before choosing the plaintiff, has to factor in the
possible choices that the plaintiff could make with respect to forum. As the plaintiff controls the
forum, the defendant is unable to determine with certainty that the forum chosen will favor him.
In fact, the defendant can reasonably assume that the plaintiff will choose a plaintiff-favoring
forum.64 This acts as an ex ante deterrent for the defendant from undertaking actions that will
result in litigation. In fact, much of conflicts law, in conjunction with venue and transfer statutes,
and jurisdiction restrictions, results in this sort of countervailing power, where choices are
available.

63

See Moore and Parisi supra note 8.

64

That is, the choice of forum is ex post, and the plaintiff will choose strategically. See Moore and Parisi supra note

8.
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Nonetheless, the various approaches to conflicts law continue to receive criticism, and
suggestions for improvement.65 Forum shopping, and the associated uncertainty is one concern
that repeatedly surfaces in this literature. One commentator has also suggested that conflicts law
is at best marginally relevant.66 Forum shopping, it will be argued, is part of the common law
system that supports a Hayekian law of liberty.67 Attempts at grandiose reform, based on
academic theories, are likely to fail, for the same reasons that planned economies failed – the
problem of information in an uncertain world.

III.

CONFLICTS LAW AS SPONTANEOUS ORDER

Much of the criticism of the various regimes of conflicts law is based on the notion that
standards, and varying regimes create uncertainty, which increases transaction costs. The
uncertainty affects actions ex ante; agents can either overcompensate or under-compensate to
deal with the uncertainty.68 Forum shopping also increases litigation costs by adding an issue that
needs to be litigated – the choice of forum and law.69

It can also trigger a “race to the

65

See authorities cited supra notes 8,9,10 and 13. There are a few defenders of forum shopping. See e.g., Antony L.
Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. Va. L. Rev. 167 (complaining that the term forum ‘shopping’ is
derogatory); and Note: Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (claiming that such choice is helpful
in achieving legitimate goals of the justice system.). See also Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
66

See Sterk supra note 13.

67

The advantages of ex ante choice of forum are apparent. Ex post forum shopping is more problematic, as we
discuss below.

68

See, e.g., Moore supra note 8 (pointing out that uncertainty about the scope of the patent might result in an
effective grant of a broader right to the patent holder, as competitors try to avoid an infringement suit).

69

If some individuals are statistically more likely to be plaintiffs than defendants, the opportunity for forum
shopping may have biased distributional effects with a potential impact on the ex ante incentives of the parties. In
contrast, the ex post efficiency implications are independent of the random nature of the status of plaintiff. The
plaintiff’s advantage will trigger a “race to the courthouse,” inducing potential defendants to expedite the filing in
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courthouse” as parties file cases strategically. Forum shopping can also result in the overburdening of certain courts, as litigants seek the most favorable forum.70 In addition, there is a
normative component, centered about the idea that the possibility of forum shopping implies that
the law is can be manipulated. Thus, forum shopping undermines the authority of substantive
state law.71
Of these arguments, the effect of ex ante uncertainty over parties’ actions, and the ex post
effects in the litigation over the forum are among the most substantial. Decreasing uncertainty is
clearly desirable. What is less clear is the best way to do so.
In theory, conflicts rules that always pass the mirror-image test seem optimal. Given
uncertainty in so many other aspects of the transaction and litigation, clear rules might not be
welfare-maximizing, in the sense that substantive polices effectuated are ones that maximize the
welfare of the citizens of the state. The proposals there can be set of clear conflicts rules that
always meet the mirror-image tests are victims of the nirvana fallacy. The fact is that even under
the rules of the Restatement (First), courts became adept at using escape devices and

order to preempt the opponent’s choice of jurisdiction. Once a party establishes jurisdiction, the opponent’s claim is
generally litigated as a counterclaim or reconventional demand. The “race to the courthouse” may thus have
substantial efficiency implications, accelerating the filing process and bringing to trial cases that may not have
matured into court claims, had they been left to the choice of the natural plaintiff. Litigating such cases is clearly
inefficient. See Parisi and O’Harasupra note 20
70

See Note, supra note 65 at 1684. Moore, undertakes empirical analysis, and finds that a disproportionately high
number of patent claims are filed in certain courts, such as the Eastern District of Virginia (“the Rocket Docket”).
But, she also finds very high transfer rates out of this court. Litigants might favor the Eastern District of Virginia
due to the speed of resolution and the expertise of the judges in technical patent matters. See Moore supra note 8.
But both these grounds seem to quite legitimate reasons to prefer this court. That is, this is legitimate forum
selection, which is welfare-enhancing, rather than forum shopping which might be a zero or negative sum game. The
transfer rate might suggest that the judges are quite good at weeding out cases that are illegitimate forum shopping.
71

See Note, supra note 65 at 1684. This importance assigned to uniform outcomes and nonmanipulablity of law is
base on version of legal positivism. Id. at 1685. The underlying notion is one of the law being immutable. See
Moore and Parisi supra note 8. However, as Hayek pointed out, society is continuously evolving, as is the law.
Given that the law is not immutable, this uniformity is unsustainable inter-temporally. See Hayek supra note 3.
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characterization to avoid the outcomes that would have followed if the rules had been
scrupulously followed.72
Fundamentally, the idea of rigidly followed conflicts rules, as a legal issue wholly
separate from the substantive claim, is alien to the working of the common law system. As
Stewart Sterk points out,
common law judges do not decide cases deductively, starting with major premises and then
applying those premises to the facts at hand. Instead the start with the facts before them, form a
tentative judgment about which party deserves to win, and then use precedent and other sources of
authority as a background against which to check, or rethink, their conclusions.73

He then cites the late Charles D. Brietel, the former chief judge of the New York Court of
Appeal, as explaining the process that judges followed. According to Breitel, judges first asked
themselves which party deserved to win. Only after they had determined where justice lay in the
individual case did the judge ask the next question: “What harm to the jurisprudence will result if
I do justice in the individual case?”74
Even though Sterk uses this to support his thesis about the “marginal significance” of
conflicts theory, the process he describes is very much like the one Hayek describes as one that
results in spontaneous order.75 The judge weighs expectations in view of existing rules, in
making his determination of which expectations to fulfill.76 That is, the judge makes a decision
about which party deserves to win, and tries to estimate how the outcome will diverge from
72

See e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553 (1989). See
also, discussion supra Part I.B.

73

Sterk supra note 13 at 994-995.

74

Sterk supra note 13 at 995. Sterk also quotes Cardozo, “the common law does not work from pre-established
truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is inductive, and
it draws its generalizations from particulars.” Id. quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 22-23 (1921).
75

See Hayek supra note 3 at 102.

76

See Hayek supra note 3.
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existing rules. The judge, as much as any other agent in society, has information that is
fragmented. The judge will not always be correct, but, over time, just rules, which permit the
perpetuation of a social order will survive, and evolve.77 This is the essential process for the
evolution of spontaneous order.78
If Hayek is right, the common law should be a continuously evolving spontaneous order.
In the section below, we examine the evolution of conflicts law in three broad categories –
contracts, torts and real property - from Restatement (First) to Restatement (Second) for evidnce
of such an evolution. It is not only the move from rules to standards, but also the concurrent
evolution of personal jurisdiction principles that is important in any analysis of conflicts law
from a Hayekian perspective.

A.

Contracts

The division of power over party choice and forum choice differs across different sorts of
claims. Thus, for example, most contracts are entered into voluntarily. In a contract, both parties
have power over the choice to participate. It is reasonable to assume that the choice of law and

77

Id.

78

Common law shares this characteristic of evolution towards efficiency with free markets, even when much of the
information is not merely fragmented, but also inarticulated. Hayek was among the earliest to recognize this, supra
note 1. See also Carlo Zappia, Private Information, Contractual Arrangements and Hayek’s Knowledge Problem,
manuscript, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF SIENA (1995). Evidence from experimental economics
has demonstrated convincingly that markets can achieve very high levels of efficiency even when information is
fragmented in this Hayekian sense. If markets can do this, there is no a priori reason to assume that the common law
will fail to achieve a similar success. See e.g., Vernon L. Smith, Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental
Science, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 923 (1982) (proving in experiments that even when agents have private information
about costs and utility, the market can achieve an equilibrium that is extremely close to the competitive one);
Vernon L. Smith, Exchange, Economic Theory, and the Hayek Critique, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE.
See generally, DOUGLAS A. DAVIS and CHARLES A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (1993).

20

forum in the contract reflect the ex ante preferences of the parties, and are welfare maximizing.79
It seems intuitively reasonable enforce such choices.80
However, the Restatement (First) did not generally permit the enforcement of a choice of
law clause made by the contracting parties.81 Such contract clauses were disfavored, as being
“private law.” According to Restatement (First), the law of the place of contract applied.82
Restatement (Second) explicitly provided for honoring the voluntary choice of law by
contracting parties.83 In cases where the parties failed to make such a choice, the Restatement

79

This choice is also likely to be the efficient one, especially if the contract is not one of adhesion. See O’Hara and
Ribstein, supra note 8.
80

On the other hand, the relationships entered into as a result of torts are at least partially, and often wholly,
involuntary in nature. If the defendant chose the plaintiff, it is reasonable to leave the choice of forum to the plaintiff
under the framework of adverse selection and moral hazard discussed supra. Conflicts law for torts is discussed infra
Part III.B.

81

See generally, Brilmayer, supra note 22. According RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS OF LAW
(herinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS), § 7, comment on clause (b),
c. Choice of Law.
When an action is brought upon a contract made in another
state, the court at the forum must decide, by its own rules of Conflicts of Laws, by the law of what
state the situation is to be controlled. If it decides that that law of the second state is to be applied,
it must thereupon decide whether it is the entire law of the other states, including its Conflicts of
Laws rules, or only its rules pertaining to the law of contracts when no question of foreign law is
involved. Under the rule stated in this Section, the court at the forum applies only the contract law
of the other state.
Under §§ 311 et seq., the law of the place of contracting applied to all contracts. There is no provision for a choice
of a third state law by the parties.
82

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS § § 311 et seq.

83

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS OF LAW (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS).
§ 187, Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(1) The law of state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision
in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2)The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be
applied, even if the particular issue is one the parties could not have resolved by an explicit
provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either,
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no reasonable basis for the parties’ choice or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state . . . .
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(Second) set up a multi-factor test to determine the state with the most significant relationship
with the case, which would then be the law applied.84
The modern rule is for courts to honor choice of law and choice of forum clauses almost
always.85 The disfavored treatment of choice of law clauses is one part of Restatement (First)
that has been discarded even in states that otherwise still follow Restatement (First) ruled for
conflicts. Restatement (Second) explicitly allows for the parties to choose the applicable law.
It seems not only efficient, but also just to recognize the parties ex ante choice of law. An
ex ante choice of law, as a contract clause, eliminates the adverse selection and moral hazard
problems discussed above. The bargaining is done before the contract is signed; the final
provisions reflect an outcome that is welfare enhancing for both parties. If this were not the case,
the contract would not be effectuated. There is no room left for strategic choice of forum, once
the choice has been made in the contract provisions. This explicit choice also eliminates
uncertainty, and an issue for litigation. Honoring a contractual choice of law also enhances
judicial economy. It is not surprising, viewed from a Hayekian perspective, that the Restatement

(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is the local law of the state of
the chosen law.
84

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, § 188, Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by The Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under
the principles stated in § 6. . . .
(Section 6 sets out the factors to be taken into consideration in choice of law questions.).
85

The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a choice of law even when it was the state of neither party. See The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (upholding choice of law of a third country). Sometimes choice of
forum in contract that is effectively one of adhesion, has been upheld. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
(499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding the choice of forum clause in the fine print in a ticket, where the term was not
bargained for).
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(First) rule disfavoring contractual choice of law clauses has effectively become obsolete, and
has been replaced by a rule that is more efficient.86
This conclusion holds for cases where there is an explicit choice of law in the contract. In
the absence of such a explicit choice of law clause, Restatement (Second) applies a multi-factor
test.87 As with any standards based approach, this leaves room for ambiguity. The assessment of
which state has the most significant relationship is dependant on a number of factors, many of
which will be evaluated subjectively by the judge. That is, there is some room for strategic forum
shopping. But the Restatement (First) was not entirely objective either. The court could use
escape devices, such as characterization, public policy and renvoi, to evade the outcome dictated
by the rule.88 The frequency of use of escape devices could vary across courts, and a plaintiff
could engage in strategic forum shopping even in a rules-based regime. Thus, the Restatement
(Second) need not necessarily increase uncertainty in a contract claim. Further, if it is true that
the modern approaches tend to favor the forum state,89 this is something that the parties can take
into account when drafting the contract, and during performance, even in the absence of an
explicit choice of law clause. Lastly, if conflicts law is an example of spontaneous order, this
rule will eventually become part of the possibly unarticulated rules that make up the social order,
further diminishing socially undesirable forum shopping.
86

For a comprehensive analysis of the efficiency considerations in favor of enforcing contractual choice of law, see
O’Hara and Ribstein, supra note 8.

87

RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONFLICTS, §§ 188, 6.

88

See generally, Brilmayer, supra note 22.

89

Certain empirical evidence suggests that the modern approaches, including Restatement (Second), are more
forum-oriented that Restatement (First). See e.g. P. Bouchers, The Choice of Law Revolution: An Empirical Study,
49 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 357 (1992); M. Solomine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
GEORGIA L. REV. 49 (1989). But the most rigorous econometric study extant finds that while the modern approach
states use forum law more often than states using the Restatement (First), there was very little difference at the
margin between the two groups when it came to recovery favoring choice of law rulings. See Parisi and O’Hara,
supra note 20, citing S.Thiel, Choice of Law and the Home Court Advantage. Ultimately what the parties care about
is recovery – and there seems to be little strategic advantage to gained through forum shopping.
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B.

Torts

Claims based on tort law are probably the most justified target for concerns about
strategic, illegitimate forum shopping. There is one critical difference between tort-based
relationships and contract-based relationships. Contractual relationships are essentially
consensual in nature. The relationship between the tort-feasor and the victim is essentially nonconsensual. In the case of an intentional tort, the tort-feasor chooses the victim; that is, the
defendant chooses the plaintiff. In an unintentional tort, the tort-feasor does not choose a specific
victim, but acts in such a way as increase the risk of some class of persons becoming victims.90
Thus, in a tort claim, the strategic choice of participation lies with the defendant.91 Allowing the
choice of forum to rest with the plaintiff is a way of countervailing this adverse selection
problem.
The Restatement (First) rule was the law of the place of the wrong applied. The place of
the wrong was defined as the place where “the last event necessary to make the actor liable for
an alleged wrong takes place. . . . ”92 The problem with such a rule in the case of intentional torts
is quite obvious. The defendant can control the choice of law by deciding the forum in which to
commit the last necessary act. For example, an actor seeking to infringe copyright, or undertake
defamation, can choose his victim, and choose the state in which to under the act. The defendant
controls both the strategic participation choice and the strategic forum choice. This result of the

90

The classic unintentional tort is a traffic accident. The tort-feasor does not choose to run down a specific victim,
but, by driving recklessly, endangers other people on the road with him; that is, the reckless driver increases the risk
of one of the other drivers becoming a victim, and suffering loss.
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See discussion supra Part II; see also, Moore and Parisi, supra note 8.

92

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS § 377. This is a lex locus delecti rule.
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rule is likely to be very unfavorable to the plaintiff – the party that has to bear the loss caused by
the action of the defendant.
The rule of the last necessary act is not quite so egregious in the case of unintentional
torts. However, the rule can result in outcomes that violate expectations that would otherwise be
justified. Consider the case of Alabama Great South. R.R. v. Carroll.93 The plaintiff employee
was a resident of Alabama, as was defendant employer. The negligent conduct took place in
Alabama, but the actual injury occurred in Mississippi. The court applied Mississippi law, which
denied the plaintiff certain damages he would have recovered under Alabama law. In this case,
the parties’ could have reasonably justified expectations that their common domicile would
govern the loss distribution rules. However, the lex locus delecti rule of Restatement (First)
would not permit this separation of conduct regulating rules from loss distribution rules.
It is not surprising that courts used escape devices so often in torts cases under the
Restatement (First) regime. The court invoked the public policy exception in Paul v. Nat’l Life,94
to allow the citizen plaintiff to recover damages that would have been barred under the lex locus
delecti rule. Tort law was the first area where conflicts law evolved away from such a rigid rule.
The often criticized cases based on grouping of contacts, including Babcock v. Johnson,95
Neumeier v. Kuehner,96 and Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc, all demonstrated an effort by
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97 Ala. 126 (1892).
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352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). See text supra note 38.

95

191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). Plaintiff and defendant were New York residents. The accident occurred in Ontario,
which had a guest statute barring recovery. New York law permitted recovery. The court applied New York law, on
the basis that New York was the center of gravity.

96

286 N.E. 2d 454 (1972). Plaintiff was from Ontario; defendant from New York. The accident took place in
Ontario. The court applied Ontario law, as being fair to the plaintiff. The court is concerned about the plaintiff’s
expectations, as the party who suffered the loss. This is consistent with Sterk’s characterization of the common law
process, and Hayek’s concept of the process of judge-made law. See Sterk supra note 13 and Hayek supra note 3.
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the courts to consider party expectations.97 The first two were unintentional tort cases; the last
was an intentional tort. The court effectively distinguished between conduct regulating rules and
loss regulating rules in attempting to achieve a just outcome. The Restatement (Second) took this
process further when it set up a multi-factor test to determine which state had the most
significant relationship with the claim; the law of this state would be the one that applied.98
This test has been justly criticized as being vague and increasing uncertainty in tort cases.
But it is not clear that this uncertainty is any more than that created by the use of escape devices
under Restatement (First). Further, the uncertainty inherent in the multifactor test has the effect
of reducing the adverse selection- moral hazard problem in intentional torts, precisely because it
can incorporate possible strategic problems into the analysis. The Restatement (Second) test
looks at factors beyond the lex locus delecti, including the domicile of both parties, and the
nature of the relationship between the two.99 Any consideration of the plaintiff’s domicile
immediately reduces the strategic advantage in forum selection held by the defendant in an
intentional tort claim.
O’Hara and Ribstein have advocated a place of injury rule for non-market torts, and a
place of sale rule for product liability cases, where there is no explicit choice of law clause.100
They advocate enforcing choice of law clauses where they exist for market-based torts, such as
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480 N.E.2d 679 (1985). Plaintiff and defendant were New Jersey residents; the tortious conduct took place in New
York. The New York court chose to apply New Jersey law on a grouping of contacts analysis. As the issue was
conduct regulating rules, applying New Jersey law best fulfils expectations of the parties. Note that is was an
intentional tort.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 145, 6.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 145.

100

See O’Hara and Ribstein, supra note 8.
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product liability. They argument is based on efficiency considerations, and would certainly
reduce ex post strategic forum shopping.
A choice of law clause creates ex ante certainty and eliminates ex post strategic forum
shopping. Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that such a rule is either already in place, or in
the process of evolution. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,101 the Court upheld the choice
of forum clause listed in a cruise ticket, even though the term had not been bargained for. To the
extent that the other suggestions are consistent with the common law approach, they should
emerge in due time.

C.

Real Property

Real property is an interesting case, because it is one area where there is still a clear rule
in conflicts. Claims based on real property include those of land use, title, ownership interest,
testamentary disposition or intestate succession.102The law of the situs, that is, the law of state
where the land is located, applies. This was the rule of Restatement (First);103 Restatement
(Second) effectively retained this rule.104 Advocates of efficiency recommend retaining this
rule.105 Even though Baxter criticized this rule,106 there has been remarkably little controversy
about the situs rule for real property.
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499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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See O’Hara and Ribstein supra note 8 at 1219. See generally, Brilmayer, supra note 22.
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RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS, §§211 –251.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, § 189.
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See O’Hara and Ribstein, supra note 8 at 1219 –1221.
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According to Baxter, the relevant relationship is that between sovereigns and people, not sovereigns and
property. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and The Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963) (arguing that
the objective of choice of law should be to maximize effectuation of states’ interests).
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This rule can be justified due to the unique feature of real property - its immovability.
Any ruling affecting real property will inevitably impact the situs state. The situs state is most
likely to have a regulatory advantage in determining the use of real property, such land use,
zoning and nuisance laws. That is, real property can result in externalities; the situs state is in the
best position to determine the nature of these externalities, and regulatory action needed to
correct negative externalities.107 In the case of real property, where there are externalities, the
participation choice rests with the land user; to the extent there are negative externalities, those
affected by such externalities have no participation choice. Thus, the land user has advantage in
the adverse selection problem.
Enforcing the law of the situs state offsets such a strategic advantage. A clear situs rule
for real property also has other benefits. It eliminates uncertainty in two significant ways. First,
there is a clear ex ante rule about which law applies. This eliminates the possibility of strategic
forum shopping. The law of the situs rule also eliminates one source of uncertainty in the clarity
of title. This clarifies property rights, and makes transfers easier. Part of the function of the social
order is to clarify property rights so as to permit exchange.108 From a Hayekian perspective, it is
not surprising that the situs rule for real property has survived.

D.

Personal Jurisdiction

The evolution of conflicts law cannot be discussed sensibly without an examination of
the evolution of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. There are two main concerns in limiting
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See O’Hara and Ribstein, supra note 8 at 1220.

108

See Hayek supra note 3.
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choice of forums and law. First, the law is concerned about fairness to parties.109 Second, the law
is concerned about comity, so as to reduce friction between the various jurisdictions. In the U.S.
context, this second concern falls with the ambit of the Full Faith and Credit clause.110 In the
international context, concerns about comity arise from the need to cooperate, so as to maintain a
functional system of international law, comprised of sovereign states.111
Personal jurisdiction can act as a counterweight to the forum-shopping problem. The
evolution of conflicts law away from the rules of Restatement (First) has increased the
availability of forums available to parties. Personal jurisdiction doctrine has evolved so as to
limit the possibility of strategic forum shopping by the plaintiff. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins112
effectively eliminated the opportunity to forum shop between federal and state courts. The move
from the tag jurisdiction held constitutional in Pennoyer v. Neff113 to the minimum contacts test
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington114 to the “purposeful availment” test of McGee v.Int’l
Life Ins. Co.115 has considerably restricted a jurisdiction’s assertion of personal jurisdiction on
any party. That is, when the plaintiff has the opportunity to choose the forum strategically, the
personal jurisdiction requirements limit the number of forums the plaintiff can choose. The
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This is a fundamental concern for any system of rule of law. In the U.S., the Constitutional foundation is found
in the Due Process clause. See U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V and XIV § 1.
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U.S. CONST. Art. IV. § 1.
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That is, the sovereigns follow the principle of reciprocity.
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304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that physical presence in the state is sufficient for assertion of in personam
jurisdiction).

114

326 U.S. 310 (1945) (setting up the requirement for “minimum contacts” adequate to establish “fair play and
substantial justice” for the assertion of personal jurisdiction that was constitutionally proper).

115

355 U.S. 220 (1957) (creating the three part test for personal jurisdiction: state interest, forum not unduly
inconvenient and purposeful availment of the forum).
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plaintiff’s adverse selection/ moral hazard problem is thus constrained by the need to find a
forum that can assert personal jurisdiction. Obviously the one forum the defendant can always be
sued is his own domicile. But this is likely to not be a favorable forum for the plaintiff, as the
defendant will choose a domicile that is favorable to him, if such choice is at all possible.116
The fact that personal jurisdiction limits have evolved is a way that acts as a
counterweight to possible problems in the relaxation of choice of forum suggests that the process
is in fact the evolution of spontaneous order.

IV.

FORUM SELECTION VERSUS FORUM SHOPPING

Forum selection, or shopping, is a multi-dimensional activity.117 Forum selection is an
integral part of the legal process in a world with multiple jurisdictions. The choice of forum may
give the party some control over both procedural and substantive law.118 Generally, the forum
applies its own procedural rules to determine what substantive law to apply.119
Probably the most egregious forum shopping has been due to statutes of limitations. A
statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural rule; so the choice of forum can determine
which jurisdiction’s statute is to be applied. Variation in the statute of limitations can mean that a
suit can be heard in one jurisdiction while it is dismissed in another. That a diametrically
opposed outcome possible simply due to a choice of forum is an uncomfortable reminder of the
116

Under very limited circumstances, it might be possible for a defendant to choose a domicile as a way to improve
his or her strategic position in case of litigation. Thus, for example, any time domicile may acquire relevance as a
primary or secondary connecting factor in the establishment of jurisdiction or applicable law, the strategic choice of
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vast gulf between the ideal of an immutable law and the reality that prevails in a world with
uncertainty and fragmented knowledge. Unfortunately, there is no simple or fair way to make
this problem disappear. By their nature, a statute of limitations is arbitrary – the legislature picks
some length of time after which a claim expires. There are good reasons to have such a statute,
including judicial economy and repose for the potential defendant. Forum shopping based on
statutes of limitations can possible be limited by borrowing statutes, but cannot be eliminated as
long as different states pursue different policies. States can have different durations for such
statutes for sound policy reasons, depending on their individual interests. It might be that the cost
of eliminating this source of forum shopping might exceed the benefits.
Other reasons for choosing a particular forum might be somewhat less problematic, when
the primary reason for choice of forum is something other than increasing the probability of a
favorable outcome.120 For example, the parties may choose a forum because of the speed of
adjudication.121 A rapid resolution of the dispute is desirable, as it limits the deadweight costs
associated with litigation. Parties may prefer a certain forum because of the expertise of the
judges in a specialized area, such as Delaware courts for corporation law. Again, this seems to be
forum selection that is efficiency enhancing rather than a zero-sum or negative sum game of
forum shopping.
A system that permits alternative forum can also perform a useful function in increasing
competition among the states.122 As long as exit is possible, states will be less likely to skew
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laws in favor of a particular class. For example, to the extent that laws do become plaintifffavoring, as in the United States, which has acquired a reputation for having juries that tent to
had out large damage awards in tort suits,123 there are two limiting factors: the transfer statutes
that allow the defendants to seek a transfer of the case to another court, usually from state to
federal;124 and the personal jurisdiction doctrine. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown
itself inhospitable towards alien claims, and has not hesitated to use the forum non conveniens
doctrine,125 giving little deference to plaintiff’s choice of forum, when the forum chosen is a
foreign one. The problem with the use of the forum non conveniens doctrine is, of course, that
the tort defendant can use this strategically, when the victim is an alien, and the defendant is a
U.S. entity.126
However, as Hayek said, not every expectation can be satisfied every time. Imperfect,
fragmented knowledge, and an evolving order make it impossible to achieve a perfect result
every single time. What is both achievable and worthwhile is to have a system where rules
evolve, and are tested over time. The inadequate rules get discarded, and the rules that promote
liberty are perpetuated. In a continuously evolving society, the ideal of an immutable law with
immutable rules is a chimera.
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Conflicts law is best viewed as a continuously evolving spontaneous order. It is only the
fragmented nature of our knowledge that makes it appear that there is no order. Forum shopping,
or alternatively, forum selection is part of this order. As such, forum shopping is not going to
disappear at any point in the foreseeable future. In fact, as long as there are overlapping
jurisdictions and multiple legal regimes, forum shopping (or selection) cannot be eliminated. Nor
is it obvious that eliminating forum shopping is unambiguously welfare enhancing.
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